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CHANGING WITH THE TIMES: WHY
RAMPANT SCHOOL VIOLENCE WARRANTS
LEGALIZATION OF PARENTAL WIRETAPPING
TO MONITOR CHILDREN'S ACTIVITIES
Alison S. Aaronson*
INTRODUCTION
In light of the tragic shootings that occurred at Columbine High
School in Littleton, Colorado,1 parents have been encouraged to
supervise their children more closely.2 Many parents have ques-
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.A., Brandeis University, 1999.
Thanks to Professor Rosato for her guidance, to Francis Chin and Rose Patti for
their invaluable assistance, and to my family and friends for their encouragement
and support.
l On the morning of April 20, 1999, seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold and
eighteen-year-old Eric Harris shot and killed two students in the parking lot of
Columbine High School. Matt Bai, Anatomy of a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, May
3, 1999, at 24. As they proceeded toward the school, the boys shot two more
students. Id. Once inside the school, Klebold and Harris opened fire and threw
pipe bombs into the cafeteria, where more than five hundred students were
present. Id. As Klebold and Harris headed up a flight of stairs, they fatally
injured a teacher who was trying to warn other students in the library and science
rooms. Id. Inside the library, the pair tortured their innocent victims with
arbitrary and slow deaths. Id. At one point, when Klebold and Harris discovered
a girl cowering under a desk, they leaned down, said "peek-a-boo" to her, and
then shot her. Id. Klebold and Harris killed ten students in the library before
ending the terror with their own suicides. Id. In the end, their killing spree left
thirteen people dead and twenty-three injured, several of them critically. Id.
2 See Silas v. Silas, 680 So.2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) ("It is
ordinarily for the parent in the first instance to decide ... what is actually
necessary for the protection and preservation of the life and health of his child,
so long as he acts as a reasonable and ordinarily prudent parent would act in the
like situation.") (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 48, at 193-94
(1987)).
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tioned whether children's privacy should be reconsidered or
eliminated altogether.3 One supporter in favor of limiting chil-
dren's privacy rights argues:
We think privacy for children is some sort of God-given
right. It's no right at all. Kids are kids. Nowhere else in
the world is there as much of that sentiment as in the U.S.
We're just so individualistic, we make the assumption that
our kids are individuals, and if we don't let them be, we're
hampering their growth. None of that makes sense.4
Similarly, others believe that as a society that values individual
rights, we have created a situation where our children have so
many rights as citizens regardless of their status as minors, it
prevents parents from effectively disciplining and controlling
them.5 Despite parents' efforts to discipline and control their
children, some say that parents have no alternative other than to
"resort to uncomfortably intrusive methods in an attempt to keep
them safe from addiction, gangs, and guns."6 For many parents, it
is an issue of survival rather than trust; they will spy on their
children if that is what it takes to keep them safe.7 One marriage
and family therapist states that "[he] do[es] not believe it is the
parent's right, [he] believe[s] it is the parent's responsibility [to
spy] .8
3 Jean Nash Johnson, Some Parents Spy to Keep Their Children Safe,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 28, 1999, at IC.
4 Anita Manning, Parenting Without Privacy: Despite Critics, Spying on
Teens Provides Clues, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 1999, at 09D (quoting remarks of
Michael Gurian, author and family therapist in Spokane, Washington).
' See Talk of the Nation (National Public Radio Inc., radio broadcast, Apr.
27, 1999). The focus of the radio broadcast, which aired one week following the
Columbine shootings, was on parental responsibility stemming from the
commission of violent acts by children. Id. One caller pointed out that while
parents are held civilly and criminally responsible for the misconduct of their
children, the law confers so many rights on children that parents are deprived of
the tools they need to control their children. Id.
6 Leslie Brody, For Some Kids, Parents' Scrutiny Getting Intense, N.J.
RECORD, Apr. 30, 1999, at A01.
7 Johnson, supra note 3, at IC.
8 Johnson, supra note 3, at IC.
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In a society where parents are held civilly liable for damages
resulting from their children's acts,9 there is a broad consensus that
parents have the responsibility to monitor their children's activities.
Many states have enacted laws imposing criminal liability on
parents for the delinquent acts of a minor child,' ° as well as for
endangering a child's welfare by failing to exercise reasonable
supervision and control of a child to prevent him from becoming
delinquent.1" Ironically, while the need for parental responsibility
is increasing, parents' tools to supervise and control their children
are decreasing.
12
Parents who want to take an aggressive approach to monitoring
their children's activities may resort to surveillance tactics, such as
purchasing devices that tape-record their children's telephone
conversations. 13 In fact, two states, Virginia and Georgia, have
9 Christine T. Greenwood, Holding Parents Criminally Responsible for the
Delinquent Acts of Their Children: Reasoned Response or "Knee-Jerk Reac-
tion"?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 401, 401 (1997) (noting that all fifty states have
statutes imposing civil liability on parents for damages resulting from their
children's acts).
'0 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272
(West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (West 2000); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 37-1-156 (2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. 948.40 (West 2000).
" See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2000); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 568.050 (West 2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) (McKinney
2000).
12 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) (holding that a State could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental
veto over the decision of a minor to obtain an abortion); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d
1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a family planning center's practice of
distributing contraceptive devices and medication to unemancipated minors
without notice to their parents did not infringe a constitutional right of the
parents). These cases illustrate that parents are prohibited from taking actions that
they believe would be in the best interests of their children.
"3 See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 603 (6th Cir. 1998) (involving
a mother's recording of telephone conversations between her daughter and ex-
spouse); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving a
mother intercepting telephone conversations between her minor son and ex-
husband by use of a wiretap on her own phone); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp.
2d 1186, 1187 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (involving a father's recording of telephone
conversations between his daughter and his daughter's mother); State v. Capell,
966 P.2d 232, 233 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (involving a mother's recording of her
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proposed to amend their wiretapping statutes to create an exception
for parents to monitor and intercept their children's telephone
conversations. 14
This Note examines whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 should be amended to exempt
parents from liability for wiretapping their children's telephone
calls as a matter of pubic policy. Part I presents an introduction to
Title III,5 the federal statute that regulates the use of wiretapping
and other electronic surveillance, and compares it to state wiretap-
ping statutes. Part I also discusses how some courts have interpret-
ed the federal wiretapping statute to implicitly provide for an
interspousal exception while other courts reject this notion. Part II
argues that it is reasonable to carve out a parental exception to
Title III liability based on the controversial interspousal exception
to the Act. It also discusses the policy reasons behind parental
immunity. Finally, Part III analyzes the recent state legislatures'
attempts in Georgia and Virginia to amend their wiretapping
son's telephone conversation with defendant regarding a drug transaction); see
also Jacqueline L. Salmon, When Trust Dries Up, Some Parents Resort to
Spying, THE PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 21, 1999, at 1K. One parent, who felt no guilt
about taping her child's phone calls because of her concerns about substance
abuse, said that "[y]ou get so desperate that you do anything to stop it. That's the
bottom line. You fight fire with fire ... You do jungle warfare. That's what
we're dealing with here." Id.
14 See H.R. 1576, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999-2000) (enacted);
see also H.R. 1370 (Va. 2000). On April 20, 2000, Georgia's wiretapping statute
was amended to provide that a parent or guardian of a minor child may monitor
or intercept telephone conversations between such child and another person for
the purpose of ensuring the welfare of such child. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(d)
(2000). The Virginia proposed amendment, which was never adopted, provided
the following:
It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to
intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person
is (I) a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception, or (II) the
spouse, parent or guardian of one of the parties to the communication
and the communication occurs using any telephone in the residence of
such spouse, parent or guardian.
H.R. 1370(B)(2).
1" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
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statutes to allow parents to monitor and intercept their children's
conversations free from liability. This Note ultimately proposes that
Title III be amended to include a provision like the one recently
added to Georgia's wiretapping statute, allowing parents to legally
intercept and record their children's telephone conversations.
I. TITLE III AND ITS ROLE IN DOMESTIC DISPUTES
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 ("Title III") is the federal statute that regulates wiretapping
and the use of electronic surveillance. 6 It provides that "any
person" who intercepts1 7 by wiretap' 8 the private telephone
conversations of another without permission will be subject to
16 id.
" Section 2510 defines "intercept" and its related terms as follows:
(4) "intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device;
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user
by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the
ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber
or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such
subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service
and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used
by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the
ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties;
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnor-
mal hearing to not better than normal.
Id. § 2510(4)-(5).
18 Title III uses the term "wire communication" to include wiretapping.
"Wire communication" is defined as any aural transfer [a transfer containing the
human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point
of reception] made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connec-
tion between the point of origin and the point of reception. Id. § 2510(1).
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criminal and civil penalties.' 9 Title III enumerates several narrow
'9 Title III describes four ways to violate the Act. Except as otherwise
specifically provided for in this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522] any person
who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use... any electronic, mechanical
or other device to intercept any oral communication when-
(i) such device is affixed, or otherwise transmits a signal through,
a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communica-
tion; or
(ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes
with the transmission of such communication; or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device
or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises
of any business or other commercial establishment the operations
of which affect foreign or interstate commerce; or (B) obtains or
is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the
operations of any business or other commercial establishment the
operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
(v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United
States
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral,
or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication in violation of this subsection; or
(e)(i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person
the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, intercepted by
means authorized by sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b),(c), 2511(2)(e),
2516, and 2518 of this chapter, (ii) knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of such a communica-
tion in connection with a criminal investigation; (iii) having obtained or
received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, andf
with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly
authorized criminal investigation, shall be punished as provided in subsection
790
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exceptions to the prohibition. 20 However, it does not specifically
create an exception for interspousal or parental wiretapping. The
question of whether Title III should extend to domestic affairs is
one that remains unanswered. For several decades, federal and state
judiciaries have debated the scope of Title III's protection. Courts
deciding interspousal wiretapping cases refuse to apply Title III's
prohibitions to "mere domestic conflicts," relying on a lack of
congressional intent to extend Title III to the home.21 Other courts
(4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
Id. § 2511(l)(a)-(e).
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (2000). Exceptions include: (1) switchboard
operators, officers, employees, agents of providers of wire and electronic
communication services who "in the normal course of [their] employment"
intercept communications while engaged in activities incidental to their
employment, or intercept communications to protect the rights or property of the
provider of the service, or provide assistance to persons authorized by law to
intercept communications; (2) officers, employees, or agents of the Federal
Communications Commission who "in the normal course of [their] employment"
intercept communications; (3) persons acting under the color of law who
intercept communications, "where such person is a party to the communication
or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
exception; (4) persons who consent to the interception of their communications;
(5) officers, employees, or agents of the United States who conduct government
foreign intelligence activities; and (6) persons who intercept communications
through the use of an extension telephone being used in the ordinary course of
business. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (2000).
21 See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a parent's interception of telephone conversations of her minor son
within her home, without the son's knowledge or consent, was not prohibited by
Title III because Congress did not intend to apply Title III to familial relations);
Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a former
wife could not recover civil damages against her former husband who wiretapped
her conversations with a third party because Congress did not intend its
regulations to invade the realm of personal acts within the marital home); Lizza
v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that "[a]bsent a signal,
either in the statute itself or legislative history, Congress intended that the Act's
criminal and civil proscriptions and liabilities to extend to a decision by a spouse
to record conversations on his own residence's telephone, this Court must decline
to impute such an intent."); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d
Cir. 1977) (holding that a husband who secretly intercepted and recorded his ex-
wife's conversations with their eight-year-old daughter did not rise to the level
of criminal conduct Congress intended to be covered by Title III).
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refuse to create an exception to Title III for domestic wiretapping
where Congress has not explicitly provided one. 2 Like their
federal counterparts, most state courts have found that their
wiretapping statutes do not contain an interspousal exception, either
based on the statutory language, or lack of specific statutory
provisions regarding an explicit spousal exception.
A. Examining the History and Legislative Purpose of Title
III
Title III was originally enacted to provide law enforcement with
a weapon to use in the war against organized crime, 24 and pur-
ported to end violations of privacy.25 Prior to the passage of Title
22 See, e.g., Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539-41 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Congress did not intend to keep interspousal wiretapping beyond
the reach of Title III); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that there is "no legal basis in Title III or its legislative history to
insulate [wiretappping spouses] from Title III's reach or its civil penalties");
Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that there is
no indication that Congress intended to imply an exception to interspousal
wiretapping cases).
23 For cases declining to recognize an interspousal exception in their state
wiretapping statute based on the statutory language, see generally W. Va. Dep't
of Health & Human Res. ex rel. Wright v. David L., 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va.
1994); Ransom v. Ransom, 324 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1985); Markham v. Markham,
272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973); M.G. v. J.C., 603 A.2d 990 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1991),
overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Whitaker, 713 A.2d 20 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998); Standiford v. Standiford, 598 A.2d 495 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991). For cases citing lack of specific statutory provisions regarding an explicit
spousal exception as a rationale for failing to recognize one, see generally David
L., 453 S.E.2d at 646; Ransom, 324 S.E.2d at 437; Markham, 272 So. 2d at 813.
24 Title III aided law enforcement officials in fighting organized crime by
providing procedures satisfying constitutional standards enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the 1960s. Megan Moriarty, Parental Wiretapping: Should
Federal Courts Provide a Civil Remedy in a Family Law Matter?, 48 U. KAN.
L. REv. 397, 399 (2000). It prevented the use of illegally intercepted conversa-
tions at criminal trials. Id.
25 Debra Bogosavljevic, Can Parents Vicariously Consent to Recording a
Telephone Conversation on Behalf of a Minor Child?: An Examination of the
Vicarious Consent Exception Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
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III in 1968, the Federal Communications Act of 193426 governed
wiretapping by law enforcement officers and private citizens,
although it failed to adequately protect individual privacy.27 The
inadequacy of the 1934 Act, coupled with the increasing use of
wiretaps in the private sphere, prompted Congress to enact Title III,
which provided for a broad prohibition of private wiretapping.28
Beginning in 1965, Congress conducted a series of hearings on
the invasion of privacy issue, where the prevalence of electronic
surveillance within the marital home was clearly noted.29 For
example, at one congressional hearing, Subcommittee Chairman,
Senator Long stated that "[t]he three large areas of snooping in
[the] field [of non-governmental surveillance] are (1) industrial, (2)
divorce cases, and (3) politics. '30 In addition, Richard Gerstein,
District Attorney of Dade County, Florida, testified before the
subcommittee that "it is routine procedure in marital disagreements
and other civil disputes for private detective agencies, generally
with full knowledge of the lawyers, to tap telephones."3 After a
number of bills were introduced, the Senate Judiciary Committee
settled on one bill entitled The Right of Privacy Act of 1967.32
The bill made electronic surveillance illegal if the surveillance
involved interstate commerce or occurred on federal soil.3 3 Thus,
the bill only prohibited wiretappings that occurred in the commer-
cial espionage context.
During the 1967 congressional hearings, Professor Robert
Blakey, who is credited as the author of Title III, recommended
that Congress reject the Right of Privacy Act of 1967 in favor of
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 321, 323 (2000).
26 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
27 Scott J. Glick, Is Your Spouse Taping Your Telephone Calls?: Title III
and Interspousal Electronic Surveillance, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 845, 856 (1992).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice
& Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2261 (1965-66)
(statement of Sen. Long).
31 Id. at 1009 (testimony of Richard E. Gerstein, District Attorney, Dade
County, Fla.).
32 Glick, supra note 27, at 857.
33 Glick, supra note 27, at 857.
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his own draft bill. Professor Blakey's proposal provided for a
complete ban on all electronic surveillance, including electronic
surveillance in preparation of marital litigation.34 Subsequently,
President Johnson signed Title III, which included Professor
Blakey's broad prohibition on all private wiretapping, into law. 35
Irrespective of the foregoing, however, Title III's legislative
history does not manifest a congressional desire to include all
domestic wiretapping within the purview of Title III. Its legislative
history nowhere reveals that the drafters included parents in its
broad prohibition. Senator Long and Professor Blakey's testimony
focused solely on wiretapping between spouses.36 The lack of
testimony concerning parental wiretapping indicates that Congress
refused to legislate the appropriate amount of privacy between a
parent and child.37 Furthermore, Professor Herman Schwartz, who
testified before the House Judiciary Committee in 1967, stated that
"nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his
teenage daughter or some such related problem. 38 Courts have
relied on these types of statements and argue that Congress did not
intend to subject parents to civil and criminal penalties for
recording their children's telephone calls out of concern for their
children's welfare.39 In examining the evolution of Title III's
applicability to the domestic relations area, it is helpful to discuss
4 Glick, supra note 27, at 859.
35 Glick, supra note 27, at 859.
36 See Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2261
(1965-66) (statement of Sen. Long) (observing that "[t]he three large areas of
snooping in [the] field [of non-governmental surveillance] are (1) industrial, (2)
divorce cases, and (3) politics); see also Glick, supra note 27, at 858 (pointing
out that "private bugging in this country can be divided into two broad
categories, commercial espionage and marital litigation") (quoting remarks of
Professor Blakey).
" Laura S. Killian, Concerned or Just Plain Nosy? The Consequences of
Parental Wiretapping Under the Federal Wiretap Act in Light of Pollock v.
Pollock, 104 DICK. L. REv. 561, 576 (2000).
38 Anti-Crime Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 989 (1967) (testimony of Professor Herman
Schwartz, of the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law).
" See, e.g., Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679.
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the history of interspousal wiretapping cases before deciding
whether to apply Title III to parental wiretapping cases.
B. The Interspousal Immunity Doctrine and Spousal
Wiretapping Cases
The interspousal immunity doctrine has its roots in common
law, growing out of the idea that upon marriage, the husband and
wife were perceived as one entity - the husband.n Many argue
that the doctrine is "antiquated"4' and "anachronistic,"42 chal-
lenging the doctrine's underlying notion that it is impossible for
one spouse to sue the other because a man cannot sue himself.
43
Despite the passage of the Married Women's Property Act,4
4
which granted married women the right to sue and be sued in their
own capacity, several courts upheld the interspousal immunity doc-
trine.45 Such courts argued that the doctrine maintained marital
peace and harmony46 and avoided the risk of collusion between
40 Glick, supra note 27, at 864; see also Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388,
392 (Ohio 1985); Jonathan D. Niemeyer, All in the Family: Interspousal and
Parental Wiretapping Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act, 81 KY. L.J.
237, 246 (1992/93).
41' Niemeyer, supra note 40, at 246.
42 Glick, supra note 27, at 865.
4' Glick, supra note 27, at 864-65.
44 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 901-02 (5th ed. 1984)
(discussing the Married Women's Property Act).
41 See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 114 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1960); Wright
v. Davis, 53 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 1949); Poling v. Poling, 179 S.E. 604 (W. Va.
1935).
46 See, e.g., Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S.W. 529, 537 (Tex. App. 1924), affd,
292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927). The court reasoned that:
[T]o hold that a cause of action... can be maintained in the courts of
the country, would endanger the institution of marriage, and would
therefore be against public policy. It is reasonably supposable that, if
the rule were otherwise, then actions and cross-actions would
constantly be instituted by and between spouses, and that the irritation
from such controversies, involving criminations and recriminations,
would strongly tend to separations and divorces, which probably would
not otherwise occur, and would thereby tend to impair the institution
of marriage, which is the chief support of the social edifice the world
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spouses.47 Those courts also expressed their concern that judicial
intervention would threaten the institution of marriage.48
Today, however, the strength of the interspousal immunity
doctrine has diminished.4 9 There are several reasons advanced as
to why the interspousal immunity doctrine may not be invoked as
a viable defense in spousal wiretapping cases. First, courts more
readily reject the notion that the institution of marriage is a "sacred
cow."50 If one spouse is secretly intercepting the private telephone
conversations of the other spouse to obtain evidence of some type
over, and without which the structure would fall.
Id.; see also Poling, 179 S.E at 607. The court asserted that:
To allow actions for damages between spouses for alleged personal.
injury would involve the placing of an additional strain on the marriage
relation. The state is vitally concerned in maintaining that relationship
and not in facilitating its disruption by authorizing personal injury
actions between them -'another step to destroy the sacred relation of
man and wife, and to open the door to lawsuits between them for
every real and fancied wrong,-suits which the common law has refused
on the grounds of public policy.'
Id. (citations omitted).
"7 See, e.g., McKinney v. McKinney, 135 P.2d 940, 954 (Wyo. 1943)
(acknowledging that suits between husbands and wives pose a danger of fraud
and collusion).
48 See, e.g., Devers v. Devers, 79 S.E. 1048, 1049 (Va. 1913) ("The well-
being and good order of society demand that husbands and wives shall in good
faith endeavor to reconcile their differences and dwell together in unity and
peace rather than to make occasion for resort to the courts for redress.").
49 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 672 n.21 (6th Cir. 1976)
("The trend appears to be toward abrogation of the doctrine.").
5 Glick, supra note 27, at 865 (citing Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 476
(E.D. Pa. 1979)). Regarding the notion that the institution of marriage is no
longer a "sacred cow" in our society, the Kratz court said the following:
The institution of marriage is not such a "sacred cow" that when
Congress seeks to prohibit a "dirty business" such as wiretapping it
must abstain (or be deemed to have abstained) from proscribing this
wrong when committed by one spouse against the other. The evils of
electronic surveillance are not peculiar to the marital relationship, and
there is no more reason to permit husbands and wives to perpetrate
these evils upon each other with impunity than there is to permit them
legally to commit any other crimes against each other.
Kratz, 466 F. Supp. at 476 (footnotes omitted).
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of illicit conduct, then it is beyond the court's control to preserve
domestic tranquility.5' That kind of behavior can hardly suggest
that a viable marital relationship exists. Second, there is little
potential for collusion between spouses in Title III actions because
the statute provides not only for a civil remedy, but criminal
sanctions as well.52 Third, the interspousal immunity doctrine has
never been applied in criminal cases.53 In United States v. Jones,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow interspousal
immunity to bar the defendant's criminal prosecution, acknowledg-
ing that "[e]ven in states which recognize interspousal immunity,
that immunity does not apply to criminal prosecutions. '"' A final
reason for denying application of the state-created interspousal
immunity doctrine to Title III, is that a state law cannot supersede
a cause of action created by a federal statute.55 Allowing a state-
created doctrine to trump federal law would violate the Supremacy
Clause.56 One commentator argues that "[c]arving out an inter-
spousal immunity exception in Title III is simply extralegal
policymaking by the judiciary - indeed, bad policy - that has
neither been approved by Congress nor presented to the President
for his signature. 57
Even in jurisdictions that have maintained the interspousal
immunity doctrine, most courts have failed to apply the doctrine in
5 Moriarty, supra note 24, at 414.
52 Section 2511(4)(a) provides that a person who violates subsection (1) of
the section can be fined or imprisoned up to five years, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(4)(a) (2000).
53 Glick, supra note 27, at 865.
54 542 F.2d 661, 672 (6th Cir. 1976).
15 Glick, supra note 27, at 866.
56 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby;
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
17 Glick, supra note 27, at 869.
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the context of Title III relating to domestic disputes.5 8 For exam-
ple, in Burgess v. Burgess, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar a civil cause of
action for money damages brought by one spouse against the other
under the Florida wiretapping statute.59 The court found that the
statute applied to "any person" and did not distinguish between
married and unmarried individuals. 6° Furthermore, the court stated
that interspousal immunity must be denied in these situations since
the purpose of the doctrine is to preserve marital harmony.6'
Applying the doctrine in situations where one spouse secretly
intercepts the private telephone conversations of the other spouse
without fear of punishment, the court opined, only encourages such
actions, thereby destroying any marital harmony that previously
existed.62
The Delaware Superior Court in State v. Jock faced a similar
interspousal immunity argument.63 Although the state recognized
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, the court declined to apply
the doctrine to exclude a husband from suit under the Delaware
wiretapping statute for illegally intercepting his wife's telephone
conversations. 64 The court held that the justifications for inter-
spousal immunity did not apply in a wiretap prosecution, noting
that allowing interspousal wiretapping would do nothing to foster
marital harmony, the very purpose of the doctrine.65 In addition,
the court concluded that an exception for interspousal wiretapping
violates the privacy interests of innocent third parties.66
" See, e.g., Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 475 (stating that a Title III cause of
action "is provided by federal law and cannot be subverted by any state law or
policy"); Jones, 542 F.2d at 672 n.22 (noting that husbands and wives have
always been regarded as separate individuals in criminal proceedings).
'9 447 So. 2d 220, 223 (Fla. 1984).
60 Id. at 222.
61 Id. at 222-23.
62 Id.
63 404 A.2d 518 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979).




C. State Wiretapping Statutes
States may regulate the wiretapping field by enacting wiretap-
ping statutes, although they are not required to do SO. 67 Title III
provides only "the minimum" constitutional protection against
unauthorized interception.68 States may enact stricter standards if
they determine that such standards are necessary to protect their
citizens constitutional right of privacy from wiretapping. 69 How-
ever, a state cannot pass a law with less stringent standards than
the federal law.7° Courts must decide whether Title III preempts
the state statute to determine which statute applies in a particular
case.7 The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Vitello held that a federal statute will preempt a state statute that
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."72 States can avoid
preemption by enacting statutes that either closely resemble the
67 Stacy L. Mills, He Wouldn't Listen To Me Before, But Now ... :
Interspousal Wiretapping and an Analysis of State Wiretapping Statutes, 37
BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 420 (1998). Section 2516(2) of Title III indicates that
Congress did not intend to regulate the field of wiretapping entirely. It provides
that:
The principle prosecuting attorney of any State ... if such attorney is
authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State
court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or
approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications,
may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity
with § 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an
order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications by investigative or law enforcement officers
having the responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to
which the application is made, when such interception may provide or
has provided evidence of the commission of [an offense].
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (2000).
68 Richard I. Zuber, Domestic Eavesdropping and Wiretapping: Admissibility
of Intercepted Communications, 21 COLO. LAW. 455, 456 (1992).
69 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (2000).
70 Mills, supra note 67, at 420.
"' Mills, supra note 67, at 420.
72 337 N.E.2d 819, 835 (Mass. 1975).
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federal statute, or are more restrictive, but not more permissive
than Title Il. 73
State wiretapping statutes are usually modeled after Title III,
and generally only deviate from the federal statute in minor
ways.74 A majority of states have taken a similar position to Title
III in refusing to recognize an explicit interspousal wiretapping
exception in their statute.75 Nonetheless, a minority of states have
placed language in their wiretapping statute that can be construed
to contain a possible interspousal exemption.7 6 Given the reluc-
tance of most federal courts confronting the interspousal wiretap-
ping issue to recognize an interspousal exception to Title III, the
73 Id.
"4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626A.02(1) (West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62(A) (Michie 2000); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 968.31(1) (West 2000); see also Mills, supra note 67, at 430. Like
Title III, these state statutes prohibit the intentional interception, use, or
disclosure of wire and oral communications, as well as make it unlawful to have
another person commit these acts. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (West
2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02(1) (West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
62(A) (Michie 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(1) (West 2000). In addition,
these state statutes punish the intentional use of interception devices, or having
another person utilize those devices to intercept communications. Id.
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West
2000); see also Mills, supra note 67, at 433.
76 For example, Kentucky has adopted a wiretapping statute that does not
include an express exception, but instead, an implicit suggestion of a possible
interspousal exemption. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (Banks-Baldwin
2000). The commentary states that the statute does not prohibit the "tapping of
one's own phone." Id. This language may be construed as an interspousal
exception. See Mills, supra note 67, at 433. Similarly, the language of Oregon's
wiretapping statute may also create an interspousal exception. Mills, supra note
67, at 433. The statute makes it unlawful for any person to use an interception
device to obtain a phone conversation, tamper with telephone equipment in order
to intercept communications, and use an intercepting device to tape private
conversations. See OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(1) (West 1999). However, among
those persons exempt from these prohibitions are "subscribers or members of
their family who perform the acts ... in their homes." Id. § 165.540(3).
Therefore, it seems that it is not a crime in Oregon for a spouse to intercept a
family member's private telephone communications. See Mills, supra note 67,
at 433.
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remaining state courts will also likely hold no exception exists.77
Alternatively, until the federal cases finding an implied interspousal
exception are overruled, state courts are free to recognize the
interspousal exception in their wiretapping statute.78
D. State and Federal Court Decisions
During the last three decades, state and federal courts have
debated the legality of interspousal wiretapping. Of those states
confronted with the wiretapping issue, most state courts have held
their statutes do not contain an interspousal exception for a variety
of reasons.79 Several courts have held that an exemption does not
exist based on the statutory language,8 ° while others focus on the
lack of specific statutory provisions regarding an explicit spousal
81exception. In addition to state courts, federal circuit courts have
grappled over the possibility of whether an implied interspousal
immunity exception exists in Title III. Four circuit courts have held
that Title III prohibits interspousal wiretapping,82 while two
circuits have found an implied exception to Title III that renders
the prohibition inapplicable to spouses.83
7 Mills, supra note 67, at 433.
7 Mills, supra note 67, at 433-34.
7 See W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. ex rel. Wright v. David L.,
453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994); Ransom v. Ransom, 324 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1985);
Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973); M.G. v. J.C., 603 A.2d 990
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Smith v.
Whitaker, 713 A.2d 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Standiford v.
Standiford, 598 A.2d 495 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
80 See, e.g., David L., 453 S.E.2d at 646; Ransom, 324 S.E.2d at 437;
Markham, 272 So. 2d at 813.
8 See M.G., 603 A.2d 990; Standiford v. Standiford, 598 A.2d 495 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1991).
82 Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992); Heggy v. Heggy,
944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989);
Platt v. Platt, 951 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372
(4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
83 See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 677 (2d Cir. 1977);
Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1974).
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1. State Decisions Interpreting State Wiretapping Statutes
Like their federal counterparts, most state courts have declined
to recognize an interspousal exception in their wiretapping
statutes. 84 In M.G. v. J.C., for example, the New Jersey Superior
Court refused to acknowledge an interspousal exception to its
wiretapping statute because it did not contain a specific exception
for wiretapping spouses.85 In that case, a husband, suspicious that
his wife was having an affair, secretly tapped their home tele-
phone.86 Given that there was no New Jersey authority regarding
interspousal wiretapping, the court looked to federal case law for
guidance in interpreting the statute.87 The court's interpretative
guidance was eased by the fact that the New Jersey statute is
nearly identical to the federal statute.88 The court held that
because the New Jersey statute did not include an express excep-
tion for interspousal wiretapping, the court would not provide
one. 89 This is the same line of reasoning federal courts have used
in concluding that if Congress had intended to create an explicit
exception in Title III for interspousal wiretapping, it would have
provided for one.9° Thus, the court's decision in this case "forms
part of the emerging national consensus that interspousal wiretap-
ping is prohibited under state and federal law."91
84 See, e.g., Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Kratz v.
Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979); People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal.
1992); Standiford v. Standiford, 598 A.2d 495 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
85 603 A.2d 990, 994 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1991).
86 Id. at 991.
87 Id. at 992.
18 Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2000).
89 M.G., 603 A.2d at 994.
90 See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992); Heggy
v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); Platt v. Platt, 951 F.2d 159 (8th Cir.
1989); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard,
732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir.
1976).
9' Alan M. Grosman, Tapping Into Trouble: Wiretapping and Divorce, 157
N.J. LAW. 16, 20 (1993).
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Similarly, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Standiford
v. Standiford held that the Maryland wiretapping statute contained
no explicit exception regarding the interception of a spouse's
communication. 92 The case arose under the Maryland Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Act,93 which resembles the New
Jersey statute.94 In Standiford, a wife sued her ex-husband for
intercepting her private telephone calls for nearly three years.95
The husband moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the
Maryland statute was not intended to apply to spousal wiretaps
where the spouse acted alone to intercept the calls, and was the
sole subscriber to a telephone company's services.96 However, the
court held that the Maryland statute "clearly and unambiguously"
prohibited all unauthorized interceptions and contained no exemp-
tion for interspousal wiretapping. 97
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia
Dep't of Health & Human Resources ex rel. Wright v. David L.
also declined to recognize an interspousal exception in its state
wiretapping statute.98 A husband, who no longer lived with his
wife, suspected she was abusing their children. 99 He surreptitious-
ly tape-recorded conversations between his wife and their children
in the wife's house, and sought to introduce the tapes in court.' °°
Although the West Virginia statute authorizes wiretapping when the
tapper reasonably believes the recordings will prove the commis-
sion of certain enumerated crimes (such as kidnaping, escaping
from prison and selling drugs), it fails to include child abuse and
neglect.'' Thus, given that child abuse was not an enumerated
exception to the statute, the court held the tapes were inadmissi-
ble. 102 Furthermore, the court found that the statute clearly and
92 598 A.2d 495, 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
93 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West 2000).
94 Grosman, supra note 91, at 19.
95 Standiford, 598 A.2d at 497.
96 Id. at 498.
97 See id. at 499.
9' 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994).
99 Id. at 648.
100 Id.
'o' Id. at 651 n.7; see also W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-8 (2000).
'02 453 S.E.2d at 651 n.7.
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unambiguously prohibits the recording of conversations between
spouses.1o3
2. Federal Decisions Interpreting Title III
The Fifth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to
address the issue of whether Title III contains an implied exception
for interspousal wiretapping.1 °4 In Simpson v. Simpson, a husband
who suspected that his wife had been unfaithful during their
marriage, attached a wiretapping device to the household telephone
to intercept conversations between his wife and another man."°5
Following their divorce the wife filed a civil action under Title
111.106 Although the Simpson court conceded that "[t]he naked
language of Title III, by virtue of its inclusiveness, reaches this
case,"'0 7 it nevertheless concluded that Congress did not intend
to prohibit this kind of conduct. Following a "long, exhaustive, and
inconclusive" 10 8 search of Title III's legislative history, the court
found that the statute was not intended to reach domestic conflicts
normally left to state law. °9 Thus, the court found that the
13 Id. at 652.
'04 Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974).
105 Id. at 804.
106 Id.
'07 Id. at 805.
108 id.
"o9 See id.; see also Janecka v. Franklin, 684 F. Supp. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that a former husband's tape recording of telephone calls made
to his home by his ex-wife to speak with their children did not violate Title III).
In analyzing Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977), a case
where a husband intercepted and taped his wife's telephone conversations with
their eight-year-old daughter and the court determined that his actions did not
violate the federal wiretap statute, the Janecka court concluded that,
[i]n emphasizing that custody disputes were matters clearly to be
handled by the state courts, the court in Anonymous was, in essence,
stating its conclusion that Congress did not intend that the federal
wiretap statute furnish a vehicle for the importation into federal court
of matters too peculiarly within the exclusive province of state
tribunals. Nothing more clearly belongs in state, not federal, court than
a contested custody proceeding.
Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26.
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husband was immune from prosecution for intercepting his wife's
telephone conversations.110
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Jones challenged the
Simpson court's recognition of an implied interspousal exception
to Title III."' In Jones, a husband intercepted and recorded his
estranged wife's conversations while present at her residence." 2
The court declined to follow the Simpson decision, calling its
conclusion "untenable because it contradicts both the explicit
language of the statute and the clear intent Congress expressed in
the Act's legislative history.""' 3 The court found that the "explicit
language" of Title III concerns "any person" who violates the
section and declared that if Congress had intended to create an
interspousal exception to the "blanket prohibition" of unauthorized
wiretaps in Title III, it would have explicitly provided for one.'14
Moreover, the court stated that Congress was well aware of the fact
that wiretaps were used in domestic relations cases." 5 Thus, the
court determined that Title III was intended to impose a "broad
prohibition" on such surveillance," 6 and because the statute
failed to create an explicit exception for interspousal wiretapping,
no exemption could be implied." 7
"' Simpson, 490 F.2d at 810.
.. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
112 Id. at 663.
113 See id. at 667.
114 Id. at 671.
15 See id. at 668. The court noted that the Senate report accompanying Title
III clearly established that the purpose of the Act was to create an across-the-
board ban on all unauthorized electronic surveillance:
Title III has its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circum-
stances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized. To assure the privacy of oral and
wire communications, Title Ill prohibits all wiretapping and electronic
surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement
officers.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 70 (1968), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2153).
16 Jones, 542 F.2d at 669.
17 Id. at 673.
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A 1979 Pennsylvania federal district court decision in Kratz v.
Kratz was a significant development toward the current majority
view on interspousal wiretapping." 8 In Kratz, an estranged
husband, who became suspicious of his wife's extra-marital
activities, placed a voice-activated tap on the family phone." 9
From the wiretap, the husband learned that his wife was having an
affair, and that she and her lover were planning a trip together to
London.20 Months after the tap had been installed, the wife
experienced some difficulties with the phone and had it re-
paired. 12 ' The phone company's repair crew discovered the tap
and reported it to the police. 22 The police arrested the husband
and charged him with violating Pennsylvania's electronic surveil-
lance statute. 23 The wife and her boyfriend subsequently filed
suit against the husband for damages under Title 111.124 The court
agreed with the Jones doctrine, finding that the legislative history
and plain language of Title III did not provide for a domestic
relations exception to the statute. 125
A majority of the federal courts have adopted the interpretation
of Title III and its legislative history as advanced by the Sixth
Circuit in Jones.126 The Fourth Circuit agreed that the plain
language of Title III includes interspousal wiretapping, and its
legislative history evinces a positive congressional intent to cover
domestic wiretapping situations. 21 The Eighth Circuit overturned
a district court decision, stating that "[e]xtending federal law into
such a purely domestic matter runs counter to the tradition federal
118 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
119 Id. at 465-66.
120 Id. at 466.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 466 n.6; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2000).
124 Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 467.
125 Id. at 468-69.
126 See, e.g., Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Title III applies to interspousal wiretaps); Kempf v. Kempf, 868
F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Title III prohibits all wiretapping
activities unless specifically excepted); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 373-
74 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); see also Moriarty, supra note 24, at 404.
127 See Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 373-74.
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courts have followed in leaving family matters to the discretion of
the state courts."' 28 The Tenth Circuit also refused to recognize
an interspousal exception to Title III, focusing on § 25 11 (1), which
"prohibits the interception, use, or disclosure of wire communica-
tions by any person except as specifically provided in the stat-
ute. 1
29
The courts, however, have been unwilling to extend the rule
espoused in Jones to domestic relations cases where parents
intercept their children's conversations with third parties, such as
the other parent. Parental wiretapping has become increasingly
common in the wake of such violent behavior as exhibited in the
Columbine massacre. The Second Circuit in Anonymous v.
Anonymous was the first court of appeals to examine parental
wiretapping. 30 In Anonymous, a husband secretly intercepted and
recorded his ex-wife's conversations with their eight-year-old
daughter. 131 After exploring the legislative history 132 and refer-
ring to the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Simpson, the court concluded
that when Congress enacted Title III, it was more concerned with
organized crime than domestic wiretaps. 133 Given that Congress
intended to refrain from invading the sphere of domestic relations,
the husband's actions did not "rise to the level of criminal conduct
intended to be covered by [Title III].'134
Until 1991, no court had determined whether Title III applied
in a situation where a child sued his custodial parent for the
interception of his telephone conversations by way of wiretap
within the family home without his knowledge or consent. The
Tenth Circuit delivered an opinion on the issue in the case of
128 Kempf v. Kempf, 677 F. Supp. 618, 622 (E.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 868
F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989).
129 Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1540.
130 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
131 Id. at 677.
132 Id. at 679 ("[Wle, like Professor Schwartz, [who testified for the
A.C.L.U. before the House Judiciary Committee] assume that 'nobody wants to
make it a crime' for a father to listen in on conversations between his wife and
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Newcomb v. Ingle.'35 In Newcomb, a mother intercepted and
recorded telephone conversations of her minor son and ex-husband
within the family home, without her son's knowledge or con-
sent.136 During one such conversation, the father instructed the
minor child on how to set fire to his mother's home. 137 The
child's mother reported the incident to a fire investigator. 138 The
tapes were used in her son's prosecution for arson. 139 The child
brought a civil action against his mother, grandfather and county
prosecutor, alleging violations of Title 111.140 The court held that
the federal wiretapping statute did not prohibit the mother's
action. 141 While recognizing that an analogy could be made to the
interspousal wiretapping cases that had been previously decided,
the court nonetheless stated that the issue of parental wiretapping
was "qualitatively different" from interspousal wiretapping.
142
E. Vicarious Consent Standard
Another issue raised in parental wiretapping cases is Title III's
exception for consensual interceptions. 143 Parents faced with
135 Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991). In Newcomb, the
court stated that "[n]o cases address the situation we have here [a situation where
a minor child sues his custodial parent for telephone interceptions made within
the family home]." Id. at 1535-36. However, a custodial parent's wiretap within
the family home of a child's non-custodial parent was considered earlier in the
case of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1977) which analyzed
the fact pattern as an interspousal wiretap case. See also Platt v. Platt, 951 F.2d
159, 159 (8th Cir. 1989) (involving a custodial mother intercepting, monitoring
and recording minor child's telephone conversations with father).
136 944 F.2d at 1535.
137 Id. Based on the recorded conversation, the assistant county attorney,
brought charges against the father resulting in a conviction. Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. All charges were dismissed. Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1536.
142 Id. at 1535-36. For a discussion on how parental wiretapping is
"qualitatively different" from interspousal wiretapping, see infra note 186 and
accompanying text.
143 David J. Anderman, Title III at a Crossroads: The Ordinary Course of
Business in the Home, the Consent of Children, and Parental Wiretapping, 141
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liability under the federal statute for tapping their children's phone
conversations have defended themselves on the theory that parents
vicariously consented to the conversation on behalf of the
child.1" Section 2511(2)(d) provides a safe harbor from liability
by declaring that "[i]t shall not be unlawful ... for a person...
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where...
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception."'' 45 The statute fails to address whether one of
the parties to the communication, namely a child, may be repre-
sented by a parent for consent purposes. 146 However, most courts
have found that parents can vicariously consent to the tapping of
their minor child's phone conversations under the theory that
parents are acting in their children's best interests. 147
A Utah federal district court was the first court to address
whether parents can vicariously consent to wiretapping their
children's phone conversations.148 In Thompson v. Dulaney, Mrs.
Dulaney recorded phone conversations between her minor children
and her husband during divorce proceedings and a child custody
battle. 1 49 Mrs. Dulaney entered the transcripts of these conversa-
tions into the custody proceedings and was subsequently awarded
custody of the children. 51 Mr. Dulaney sued for compensatory
and punitive damages under Title 111.151 Mrs. Dulaney defended
on the ground that as the children's mother, she consented to the
conversation on behalf of the children. 52 The district court held
that:
[A]s long as the guardian has a good faith basis that is
objectively reasonable for believing that it is necessary to
U. PA. L. REV. 2261, 2288 (1993).
144 Moriarty, supra note 24, at 418.
141 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2000).
146 Bogosavljevic, supra note 25, at 333.
147 See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998); Campbell v.
Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp.
1535 (D. Utah 1993); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
141 See Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1535.
149 Id. at 1537.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1537-38.
1 2 Id. at 1543-44.
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consent on behalf of her minor children to the tapping of
the phone conversations, vicarious consent will be permis-
sible in order for the guardian to fulfill her statutory
mandate to act in the best interests of the children. 53
In this case, Mrs. Dulaney's good-faith basis was that Mr. Dulaney
attempted to undermine the children's relationship with her, and
was thus harassing the children.'54 The court emphasized in a
footnote that it was limiting its holding regarding vicarious consent
to the circumstances present in the case. 55 "Thus, the Thompson
court implemented a case-by-case analysis [to determine] whether
the vicarious consent defense was permissible.' ' 56
An Arkansas federal district court was the next court to address
the vicarious consent issue. 57 In Campbell v. Price,158 a father
tape-recorded his minor daughter's conversations with her mother,
without first obtaining either's consent, to determine why his
daughter would cry and become so emotional after speaking with
her mother on the telephone.' 59 The child's mother sued the
child's father for damages under Title 111.160 The court concluded
that the father acted in accordance with a good faith view towards
his daughter's best interests.' 6'
The most recent court to confront vicarious consent was the
Sixth Circuit in Pollock v. Pollock.162 Like the Thompson and
Campbell courts, the Pollock court extended the consent exception
to permit a parent to vicariously consent to the taping of telephone
conversations on behalf of his minor child. 163 In Pollock, Mrs.
Pollock recorded conversations between her minor daughter and her
ex-husband.' 64 Mr. Pollock subsequently brought an action
"I Id. at 1544.
"4 Id. at 1542, 1544.
"' Id. at 1544 n.8.
156 Bogosavljevic, supra note 25, at 335.
151 Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1187.
'60 Id. at 1188.
161 Id. at 1191.
162 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998).
163 Id. at 610.
'64 Id. at 602.
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against Mrs. Pollock under Title 111.165 In her defense, Mrs.
Pollock argued that she recorded the conversations between her
daughter and Mr. Pollock because she "noticed a gradual change"
in her daughter, and believed her daughter was subjected to
"emotional and psychological pressure" that was "detrimental to
[her] and perhaps rose to the state of abuse or emotional harm or
injury."' 66 In other words, Mrs. Pollock claimed that the record-
ings were motivated by concern for her daughter's best interests.
Although the Sixth Circuit found that a question of material fact
existed as to Mrs. Pollock's motives, and reversed the district
court's decision granting summary judgment, the court nevertheless
concluded that the doctrine of vicarious consent exempted Mrs.
Pollock from liability under Title 111.167 The court applied the
Thompson standard and emphasized that the recording parent must
demonstrate "a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for
believing [that] such consent was necessary for the welfare of the
child."' 168
In addition to the federal courts, one state court has also
adopted the vicarious consent defense. 169 In Silas v. Silas, the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals determined that a father had the
authority to consent on behalf of his minor son to tape-record
phone conversations with the child's mother. 7 ° The court modi-
fied the Thompson standard and held that the parent must have a
"good faith basis that is objectively reasonable for believing that
the minor child is being abused, threatened, or intimidated by the
other parent."'' Although the Silas test has the added threshold
of proving that the child is abused, threatened, or intimidated by
165 Id.
166 Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
167 Id. at 610. Although Mrs. Pollock claimed that she was acting in her
daughter's best interests, the child's father and stepmother accused Mrs. Pollock
of recording the conversations out of anger. Id. at 605.
168 Id.
169 Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
170 Id. at 372.
171 Id. at 371. The child would become extremely upset and cry during the
telephone conversations with his mother. Id. Psychologists testified that the tapes
indicated that the mother was verbally abusing the child, and such abuse was
damaging to the child. Id. at 371-72.
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the other parent, the sole purpose of this stringent test is to protect
the child from physical and emotional harm. 17 2
The foregoing decisions are in accordance with the long-
standing recognition by courts that a parent should be permitted to
decide what is best for his or her own child. 173 This deference to
parents is founded in the quasi-constitutional rights of parental
autonomy and familial privacy. 174 Supporters of parental consent
on behalf of their minor children argue that parental rights are
fundamental rights. 175 Thus, parents should be afforded wide
discretion to make decisions on behalf of their children because
they are in the best position to determine their children's
needs. 176 Although critics of the vicarious consent exception
argue that such an exception seriously erodes a child's privacy
172 Killian, supra note 37, at 572.
173 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting that "[o]ur
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children ... More
important[ly], historically [the law] has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting that "[t]he history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture- and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that
"the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.").
174 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979) (holding that
parental consultation for a minor's decision to obtain an abortion is desirable and
in the best interests of the minor); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-234
(1972) (affirming Amish parents' right to decline to send their children to a
formal high school after they graduate from the eighth grade); Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (sustaining parents' authority to provide
religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the
state's requirement of public school attendance); see also Julieann Karkosak,
Tapping Into Family Affairs: Examining the Federal Wiretapping Statute as It
Applies to the Home, Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998), U. CIN.
L. REv. 995, 1017 (2000).
175 Karkosak, supra note 174, at 1017.
176 Karkosak, supra note 174 at 1017.
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interests,1 77 parents, not courts, should decide whether an en-
croachment on their child's privacy interests is appropriate. It is
logical to vicariously consent to intercepting a minor child's
conversations if it is necessary for the protection of such child.
II. PARENTAL IMMUNITY
Since its inception, the doctrine of parental immunity has been
the subject of debate in courts across the country. 7 8 As the
doctrine evolved, courts articulated several rationales in favor of its
application. 179 These courts were prompted to reconsider the
doctrine because of the harsh inequities that often resulted from its
application. 180 Originally, courts carved out exceptions to the
doctrine, imposing liability for specific parental conduct.' 8' Over
177 Bogosavijevic, supra note 25, at 343.
178 Sean S. Modjarrad, Hartman v. Hartman: Is "Parental Immunity"
Recognized?, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC., 463, 463 (1998).
179 Isabel Wingerter, Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 50 LA. L. REV. 1131,
1131 (1990).
"8 Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 463. For example, the rationale that
parental immunity should exist by analogy to interspousal immunity fails because
the.legal unity of the husband and wife, which was the basis for interspousal
immunity, never existed at common law between parent and child. See Gail D.
Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 496 (1982). Children have had separate legal identities
from their parents and could sue and be sued. Id. at 497. The rationale that
parental immunity should exist because of the fear that the injured child's
recovery may be inherited by the tortfeasor parent also fails because the injured
child should not be required to remain uncompensated because of the unlikely
possibility that he might predecease his parent, thus leaving his parent to inherit
his own adverse judgment. Id. In addition, the fear that family resources would
be depleted to the detriment of other innocent siblings if parental immunity did
not exist, fails to address the issue of whether sufficient reason exists to require
the tort victim to bear the burden of the injuries so that his siblings can avoid a
potential decrease in their standard of living or anticipated inheritance. Id. at 498-
99.
"' See, e.g., Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 1982) (holding that
the doctrine of parental immunity in a negligence case is waived to the extent of
the parent's available liability insurance coverage); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473
S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (holding a father liable for injuries sustained to his
son that occurred during the conduct of purely business activity); see also
813
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
time, however, courts began to abrogate parental immunity either
partially or entirely.
82
Although many commentators and courts have questioned the
continuing viability of the doctrine, it should be reconsidered and
revived in the context of parental wiretapping. When the doctrine
developed in the late nineteenth century, no one could have
anticipated a situation like the one that arose at Columbine High
School in April, 1999.183 Many people blamed the parents of the
students who committed the shootings, and were incredulous that
the parents were unaware their children were planning such an
elaborate scheme in their own home."8 Parental wiretapping is
a reasonable solution in response to society's growing concern for
the increasing violence that seems to be prevalent among today's
youth. The dramatic increase in schoolyard violence strongly
indicates that parents need to exercise authority and monitor their
children's activities without fear of liability. Parental wiretapping
provides the perfect tool to assist them.
A. Development of the Parental Immunity Doctrine
At first glance, it seems as if all the reasons for not recognizing
interspousal immunity as a defense under Title III cases are equally
applicable to parental immunity. 85 However, one commentator
has stated that the two doctrines should be treated as qualitatively
different:
The child-versus-parent scenario presents an even more
fragile balance: a plaintiff who sues his or her spouse
under the Act will in all probability seek a divorce, thereby
Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 463.
182 See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981) (limiting
parental immunity to instances that are within the area of parental authority and
discretion); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abolishing
parental immunity in favor of a "reasonable care standard"); Gibson v. Gibson,
479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (abrogating parental immunity and adopting a
"reasonably prudent parent standard").
83 See supra note 1.
184 See e.g., Talk of the Nation, supra note 5.
185 Moriarty, supra note 24, at 415.
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severing all ties with his or her former mate. In contrast,
a child and his or her parent will almost always have a
continuing bond with one another - nothing analogous to
a "divorce" is likely. Thus, although it is not clear how the
courts will rule on the parental immunity issue, it is clear
that interspousal wiretapping is indeed "qualitatively
different" from parent-child wiretapping.
86
The modem trend among courts in interpreting the language and
accompanying legislative history of Title III has been to include all
persons, including spouses. 187 Although Title III's legislative
history does not specifically address parental wiretapping, courts
must consider the policy of preventing suits between children and
their parents before concluding that Congress intended to prohibit
all private electronic surveillance.
The parental immunity doctrine bars unemancipated minors
from bringing causes of action for injuries sustained as a result of
their parent's tortious actions. 188 Unlike the interspousal immuni-
ty doctrine, parental immunity does not have its origins in the
common law of England. 89 Instead, parental immunity is essen-
tially an American doctrine that emerged later in this country in
three state court decisions, commonly referred to as "The Great
Trilogy."' 90 Although all of "The Great Trilogy" cases have been
overturned, they illustrate the history and rationale behind the
parental immunity doctrine.
In 1891, Hewellette v. George laid the foundation for the
modem doctrine of parental immunity.' 9' In Hewellette, an
186 Niemeyer, supra note 40, at 248.
187 Niemeyer, supra note 40, at 249.
188 Chance McLeod, Jilani v. Jilani: The Erosion of the Parental Tort
Immunity Doctrine in Texas, 28 Hous. L. REv. 717, 717 (1991).
189 Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1147 (N.J. 1983).
'90 Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), overruled in part by Borst v.
Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn.
1903), overruled by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994);
Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891), overruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox,
614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1993).
'9' 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). In Hewellette, the court never made a distinction
between actions for negligent, reckless or intentional torts. The Glaskox court,
which later overruled Hewellett, held that the doctrine of parental immunity could
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unemancipated minor sued his mother for personal injury damages
after he was falsely imprisoned in an insane asylum.' 92 Without
citing precedent and basing its decision solely on policy grounds,
the court held that so long as the parent and child are under a
reciprocal familial obligation to perform certain duties involved in
that relationship, a child cannot seek civil redress for personal
injuries resulting from a parent's wrongdoing. 193 The court
reasoned that such claims would undermine "[t]he peace of society,
... and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of
families and the best interests of society."' 194
Twelve years later, in McKelvey v. McKelvey, the Tennessee
Supreme Court precluded a minor child from recovering civil
damages for alleged cruel and inhumane treatment suffered at the
hands of her stepmother and father. 95 Analogizing parental
immunity to spousal immunity, the court determined that the
former is essential to maintaining family harmony and unity, and
protecting parents' right to control and discipline their children. 96
The final case in "The Great Trilogy" was Roller v. Roller.197
In Roller, the Washington Supreme Court refused to entertain an
unemancipated minor's claim for damages against her father who
had been convicted of raping her. 98 The court supported the
adoption of the parental immunity doctrine, citing several ratio-
nales. First, the court found that there was a possibility that the
parent might inherit his own adverse judgment if the minor child
died. 199 Second, the court reasoned that it would be difficult to
distinguish between heinous parental misconduct warranting
recovery, and less serious torts that should not be recoverable.2 °0
not be maintained in automobile accident cases, where a minor was injured as
a result of the parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Glaskox, 614 So.
2d at 912.
192 Hewellette, 9 So. at 887.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 77 S.W. 664, 664 (Tenn. 1903).
196 Id. at 665.
197 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).





Third, the court feared that family resources might be depleted at
the expense of other children.20 1 Finally, the court noted the
analogy between parental immunity and the ancient common law
interspousal immunity doctrine.2 2
Following the course of Hewellette, McKelvey and Roller, the
vast majority of decisions dealing with parental immunity since
1905 applied the immunity doctrine to relieve parents from
liability.20 3 However, many criticized the doctrine on the grounds
that it was counter-productive to the family unit, conflicted with a
child's constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, and
produced unfair results when applied. 2° As a result, such courts
modified the parental immunity doctrine.0 5 Some courts have
partially abrogated the doctrine by creating exceptions to it.2°6
Other courts have fully abrogated the doctrine and substituted an
alternative standard for determining parental immunity.207
In 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White
declared that parent-child immunity was abrogated entirely except
to exercise parental control and authority over the child, or ordinary
parental discretion with respect to such matters as food, clothing,
and other care.20 8 Thus, although the Goller standard eliminates
201 Id.
202 Id. at 788-89. "The major justification for both types of immunity is that
it 'promotes family harmony' by encouraging the private settlement of disputes."
Anderman, supra note 143, at 2305.
203 Thomas J. Herthel, Parental Immunity in Alabama: Let's Not Let Parents
Get Away with Murder-An Argument to Reexamine the Issue, 25 CUMB. L. REV.
409, 413 (1994-95). By the 1960's all but a few jurisdictions declined to adopt
the parental immunity doctrine. Id. at 412. Those jurisdictions were the District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont.
Id.
204 Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 468.
205 Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 468.
206 Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 468.
207 Brenda K. Harmon, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: The Supreme Court of
Illinois Finally Gives This Doctrine the Attention It's Been Demanding, 19 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 633, 639 (1995).
208 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wisc. 1963). The court went on to say that
allowing a child to sue would not disrupt family harmony because "the existence
of insurance tends to negate any possible disruption of family harmony and
discipline." Id.
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absolute parental immunity, it acknowledges the importance of
protecting a parent's right to exercise authority and discretion over
his or her children.2 °9 In adopting the Goller rule, the Texas
Supreme Court in Felderhoff v. Felderhoff concluded that it was
not "out of date" to be concerned with the welfare of the family
and that if children were allowed to file lawsuits against their
parents, the exercise of parental duties and responsibilities would
be seriously impeded.210
One alternative standard to the parental immunity doctrine is
the "reasonable prudent parent standard" articulated in Gibson v.
Gibson.21' The California Supreme Court disagreed with Goller's
implications that a parent has "carte blanche to act negligently
toward his child., 212 Instead, the court held that the proper test
of a parent's conduct should address the question of what an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent would have done in
similar circumstances.1 3 As one commentator observed, "The
reasonable parent standard does not prevent a parent from exercis-
ing ordinary discretion in choosing the appropriate manner in
which to raise his children; it only provides an injured child
recourse against a parent who fails to provide the care a 'reason-
able parent' would have provided under like circumstances. 214
The New York Court of Appeals in Holodook v. Spencer
adopted a different alternative standard to parent-child immuni-
ty.215 The court rejected the reasonable parent standard and
established the "no-duty" rule.216 The court did not find a need
to create or consider immunity on behalf of the parents, because it
concluded that parents have no legal duty in the first place to
supervise their children adequately. 217
209 See Harmon, supra note 207, at 640.
20 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).
211 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
212 Id. at 652-53
213 Id. at 653.
214 Carolyn A. Andrews, Parent-Child Torts in Texas and the Reasonable
Prudent Parent Standard, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 113, 125 (1988).




Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Torts proposed a change
in the parental immunity doctrine.2 8 Although the Restatement
rejects parental immunity, it provides that "[r]epudiation of general
tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission
that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privi-
leged or is not tortious.,, 2 9 This section acknowledges that
certain parental functions such as authority and supervision are
discretionary, and considers those actions so closely related to
parental discretion that liability should not be imposed for
them.22 ° Consequently, the Restatement adopted the reasonable
prudent person standard enunciated in Gibson, yet also accounted
for the unique relationship between parent and child as did the
Goller court.22 ' Together, these alternative theories form the
foundation of the present trend to abrogate, either in part or in full,
the parental immunity doctrine.
B. Justifications for Applying the Parental Immunity
Doctrine to Title III
While it has fallen out of favor over the years, the parental
immunity doctrine is occasionally raised as a defense in tort suits
between parents and their children. However, in light of increasing
violence among juveniles, the doctrine should be revived in the
context of parental wiretapping. The same public policy reasons for
upholding the doctrine that were advanced by courts in the past
continue to have merit today. Two justifications that continue to
have the greatest substance are the need to preserve family
harmony222 as well as the need for parents to have discretion in
218 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979).
219 See id.; see also Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729 (I11. 993) (holding
that immunity should be limited "to conduct inherent to the parent-child
relationship; such conduct constitutes an exercise of parental authority and
supervision over the child or an exercise of discretion in the provision of care to
the child.").
220 Sandra Haley, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is It a Defensible
Defense?, 30 U. RICH L. REV. 575, 596 (1996).
221 id.
222 See Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 477 (noting that "[t]he rationale behind
the doctrine of parental immunity was to preserve family harmony").
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exercising authority over their children.223 Courts should not be
involved in deciding matters between parents and children that
concern decisions parents are uniquely equipped to make because
of the very nature of the parent-child relationship.224 By defini-
tion, such matters involve parental discretion in care, supervision
and discipline.225
The first and most often cited justification is derived from the
idea that the family is the "cradle of civilization., 226 Indeed, the
majority of commentators deem the protection and preservation of
tranquility and harmony within the family unit as the most
significant justification for parental immunity. 227 Supporters of
the argument justify their beliefs based on the fact that the doctrine
encourages smooth functioning and integrity of the social unit.
228
A second argument in favor of parental immunity is the need to
inhibit interference with parental discipline and control. 229 Allow-
ing children to sue their parents can undermine parents' disciplin-
ary authority over their children.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Foldi v. Jeffries cogently
described the importance of retaining the limited parental immunity
doctrine for matters concerning the exercise of parental authority:
There are certain areas of activities within the family
sphere involving parental discipline, care, and control that
should and must remain free from judicial intrusion.
Parents should be free to determine how the physical,
moral, emotional, and intellectual growth of their children
223 See Andrews, supra note 214, at 121-22; Robert A. Belzer, Child v.
Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 201, 204 (1967);
Herthel, supra note 203, at 412; Hollister, supra note 180, at 504-05; Wingerter,
supra note 179, at 1136.
224 Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 728.
225 See id.
226 Belzer, supra note 223, at 203.
227 Belzer, supra note 223, at 203; Harmon, supra note 207, at 367; Herthel,
supra note 203, at 412; Modjarrad, supra note 178, at 477.
228 Belzer, supra note 223, at 203; Harmon, supra note 207, at 412.
229 Andrews, supra note 214, at 121-22; Belzer, supra note 223, at 204;
Herthel, supra note 203, at 412; Hollister, supra note 180, at 504-05; Wingerter,
supra note 179, at 1136.
230 Wingerter, supra note 179.
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can be best promoted. That is, both their duty and their
privilege. Indeed, every parent has a unique philosophy of
the rearing of children. That philosophy is an outgrowth of
the parent's own economic, educational, cultural, ethical,
and religious background, all of which affect the parent's
judgment in how his or her children should be prepared for
the responsibilities of adulthood. Such philosophical
considerations come directly to the fore in matters of
parental supervision...
The parent is clearly in the best position to know the
limitations and capabilities of his or her own children.
These intangibles cannot be adequately conveyed within
the formal atmosphere of a courtroom. Nor do we believe
that a court or a jury can evaluate these highly subjective
factors without somehow supplanting the parent's own
individual philosophy. 2
31
In a society where it has become increasingly common for
children to attempt to "divorce" their parents,232 parents must be
reassured that they can exercise supervision and control over their
children without the fear of being sued. Life is vastly different now
than it was even a decade ago. Children are falling prey to
dangerous temptations such as sex, drugs, alcohol, smoking, and
gangs, and juvenile violence, and crime have risen over the
years. 233 "[M]any changes have taken place in society that chal-
lenge the original presumption that parents are able to control their
children effectively., 234 Allowing parents to wiretap their chil-
231 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983).
232 See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 632 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(involving an unemancipated minor who filed a petition to terminate the parental
rights of his natural parents). I use the term "divorce" in the parent-child context
to refer to a minor initiating an action to terminate parental rights.
233 See Catherine Clements, Williams v. Garcetti: The Constitutionality of
Holding Parents Criminally Liable for the Acts of Their Children, 25 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 117 (1995) (noting that youth violence and crime has risen
over the years); see also Howard Davidson, No Consequences-Re-Examining
Parental Responsibility Laws, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23 (1995-96) (noting
that the level of juvenile violent crime has risen over the past decade).
234 Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality
of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 859, 879 (1991).
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dren's phone conversations can help them gain access to informa-
tion that might provide their children with appropriate medical or
psychological treatment. 235 Although some critics may argue that
parents can be involved in their children's lives by remaining
involved and focused in their children's daily activities, this
criticism ignores the fact that many children have difficulty
communicating with their parents. 36 Resorting to surveillance
tactics to keep children out of danger is a measure that clearly falls
within the boundaries of parental duties, authority and care. In
order for parents to exercise such authority, it is necessary that they
not be subject to the risk of suit at the hands of their children. The
continuing rise in school violence, as evinced by the recent
Columbine High School shootings,237 undoubtedly justifies the
need for parents to monitor their children's activities without the
fear of liability.
If a case like Newcomb arises again, where a child sues his
parents for wiretapping his private telephone conversations, the
courts should apply the standard developed in Cates v. Cates.2 38
Unlike the standard evinced in Goller v. White, which fully
abrogated the parental immunity doctrine in lieu of its two-
exception standard, the Illinois court did not abrogate the doctrine
entirely.239 Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court took a significant
step by restricting parental immunity to "conduct inherent to the
parent-child relationship. ' 24 ° A characteristic of the autonomous
relationship between a parent and child is the parent's authority to
assess the daily risks the child confronts, and to make choices
regarding the most appropriate and reasonable manner to protect
the child.24' Wiretapping the family phone is an activity that
235 See Jacqueline L. Salmon, More Parents Are Spying on Their Kids, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at 43.
236 See Julie Baumgardner, Parents Should Look at World Through Eyes of
Adolescents, CHATrANOOGA TIMES/CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Feb. 4, 2001,
at E3.
237 See supra note 1.
238 619 N.E.2d at 729.
239 Id.; see also Harmon, supra note 207, at 650.
240 See Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729; see also Harmon, supra note 207, at 650.
241 See Bang v. Tran, No. 9419, 1997 WL 538739, at *5 (Mass. App. Div.
Aug. 18, 1997) (citing Samuel Mark Pipino, In Whose Best Interest? Exploring
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certainly falls within the purview of the Cates standard. Parents
have an obligation to protect their children by assuring that they
stay out of trouble and are kept safe from harm. Thus, parental
surveillance is a legitimate means to further these ends. If the
parental immunity privilege is not revived in some form to render
parental wiretapping exempt from Title III, then Congress should
amend Title III to provide such an exception.
III. STATE AMENDMENTS
In recognition of the need to protect children from societal
harms, Virginia and Georgia have sought to amend their wiretap-
ping statutes to allow a parent to wiretap his or her child's
telephone conversations. This trend reflects the growing concern
that both parents and society have about children's safety and well-
being. Children are not only innocent victims of criminal activity,
they are often participants in such activity. However, it is difficult
for parents to monitor their children's activities, especially if their
children are reluctant or unwilling to confide in them, which is
often the case.242 Although society may be uncomfortable relying
on a parent's argument that the wiretapping was done in good faith
or the best interests of a child, no one other than a parent is in a
better position to make such a determination.243
A. Virginia's Proposed Amendment
On January 24, 2000, Virginia House of Delegates Representa-
tive Ward L. Armstrong introduced a bill to the House Committee
for the Courts of Justice, proposing to amend Virginia's wiretap-
ping statute. The amendment provided that:
It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a
person to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communica-
the Continuing Viability of the Parental Immunity Doctrine, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1111, 1127 (1992)).
242 See Baumgardner, supra note 236, at E3 (noting that one way children
deal with the conflict that results from parents' need to feel in control and
children's desire for freedom is by keeping their feelings inside).
243 See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
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tion, where such person is (I) a party to the communica-
tion, or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception, or (II) the spouse,
parent, or guardian of one of the parties to the communica-
tion and the communication occurs using any telephone in
the residence of such spouse, parent or guardian.2"
Mr. Armstrong is a trial attorney who, over the last twenty years,
has had several clients discover vital information by wiretapping
telephone conversations, particularly in the context of domestic
disputes.245
Frank Ferguson, Virginia's Deputy Attorney General in Charge
of Local Inter-Governmental Affairs, testified before the Committee
when the bill came up for review, but the Committee ultimately
decided not to act on it.246 The Committee, relying upon federal
preemption principles, declared that the bill violated Title 111.247
According to the Committee, the bill was more permissive than
federal wiretapping laws because it permitted interceptions of
communication not allowed under federal law. 248 The Committee
stated that Virginia could not allow a broader ability to search than
the federal wiretap statute allows and therefore, because the
244 H.R. 1370(B)(2) (Va. 2000).
245 Telephone interview with Ward L. Armstrong, Virginia House of
Delegates Representative (Oct. 26, 2000). According to Mr. Armstrong, if a
minor child uses a parent's telephone in the parent's home, then the parent
should be able to monitor and intercept the child's conversations. Id. Although
he believes in minors' privacy rights, Mr. Armstrong also believes that if a
parent is suspicious that a child is involved in drugs or some other illegal
activity, then the parent should determine the certainty of these suspicions. Id.
Thus, Mr. Armstrong views parental wiretapping as intervention and not
punishment. Id.
246 Telephone interview with Frank Ferguson, Virginia's Deputy Attorney
General in Charge of Local Inter-Governmental Affairs (Oct. 26, 2000). Mr.
Ferguson informed me that to kill a bill in Committee, it does not need to be
voted down; it can be killed as a result of inaction, which was the case here. Id.
247 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
248 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. When states and the federal government pass
legislation on the same subject matter, the Supremacy Clause provides that the
federal law is supreme and the conflicting state law is rendered void. Id.
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Virginia bill was less restrictive, the federal statute preempted
it.2
49
B. Georgia's New Law
As of April 20, 2000, parents in Georgia can legally monitor
and intercept their minor child's telephone conversations to ensure
the welfare of such child. Georgia's wiretapping statute was
amended to provide the following:
The provisions of this article shall not be construed to
prohibit a parent or guardian of a child under 18 years of
age, with or without the consent of such minor child, from
monitoring or intercepting telephonic conversations of such
minor child with another person by use of an extension
phone located within the family home, or electronic or
other communications of such minor child from within the
family home, for the purpose of ensuring the welfare of
such minor child. If the parent or guardian has a reason-
able or good faith belief that such conversation of commu-
nication is evidence of criminal conduct involving such
child as a victim or an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation
to involve such child in criminal activity affecting the
welfare or best interest of such child, the parent or guard-
ian may disclose the content of such telephone conversa-
tion or electronic communication to the district attorney or
a law enforcement officer. A recording ... of any such
conversation . . . made by a parent or guardian in accor-
dance with this subsection ... shall be admissible in a
judicial proceeding.25 °
This new law is a result of a case that began three years ago in
Cobb County, Georgia. 25' Kyle "Rick" Bishop, a thirty-eight-
year-old man, lived with his wife in Cobb County.25 2 The victim,
249 For a discussion on this topic, see supra notes 67-73 and accompanying
text.
250 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(d) (2000).
251 See Bishop v. State, 526 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. App. 1999), cert. denied, 2000
GA. LEXIS 465 (May 26, 2000).
252 Id. at 918.
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a thirteen-year-old girl, lived with her family across the street from
the Bishops.253 Bishop and the victim's family were good
friends.254 Until the middle of 1996, the victim was an excellent
student.255 Over the next year, the victim failed several of her
classes and experienced a significant change in demeanor.256 One
February afternoon, the victim presented her mother with a phony
permission slip for a non-existent, overnight school field trip. 257
The victim's mother became suspicious about the trip and contact-
ed the school. 8 When she asked the victim to explain the
permission slip, the victim stated that Bishop had asked her to go
with him for the weekend to "Bike Week" in Daytona Beach,
Florida.259 When the victim's parents confronted Bishop, he told
them the victim was "troubled," had been stalking him, and tried
to invite herself along on the trip.26 °
One evening, the victim's mother became aware that the victim
was talking to someone on the telephone. 26' The mother lifted up
the phone receiver and heard the victim talking to Bishop.262
According to the mother, Bishop and the victim spoke using sexual
terms and discussed killing the victim's parents. 263 After the
police denied the parents' request to wiretap the phone line, the
victim's parents purchased a tape recorder and recorded several
conversations between Bishop and the victim.2 6
Prior to Bishop's arrest and indictment on child molestation,
aggravated child molestation, and aggravated sexual battery, Bishop
moved to suppress the contents of the audiotapes of the conversa-















rights. 265 The trial court denied Bishop's motion to suppress and
ruled that the tapes were admissible under a "vicarious consent
exception to Title III as applied in other jurisdictions. 266 The
court held that the victim's parents could consent to the taping
because they had "a good faith objectively reasonable basis for
believing that it was necessary to consent [to such taping] on
behalf of their thirteen-year-old daughter., 267
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision and concluded that Bishop's motion to suppress the tape
recordings should have been granted.268 The court relied on the
specific limiting language of Georgia's wiretapping statute, which
provided that when one party to a conversation is under the age of
eighteen, the only person who can consent to an interception is a
superior court judge, although the judge must also have the consent
of the minor child. 269 Thus, the court reasoned that such language
precluded the application of the vicarious consent exception. °
In addition, the court declared that "it is solely the task of the
legislature to amend [Georgia's wiretapping statute] to allow the
admission into evidence of tape recordings such as those at issue
here, i.e., tapes made by parents with a good faith, objectively
reasonable basis for concern regarding the safety of their children
as victims of criminal conduct of another., 271
265 Id. at 919, 922. As a general principle, a litigant must assert his own
legal rights and interests, and may not rely on the rights and interests of third
parties. Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994). However, there are
several factors that that may justify exceptions to the general rule against third-
party standing: "the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him
or her a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the
litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Id. at
1122 (internal quotation marks omitted). None of these factors justify granting
Bishop third-party standing.
266 Bishop, 526 S.E.2d at 920 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
267 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
268 Id. at 922.
269 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(b) (2000).
270 Bishop, 526 S.E.2d at 921-22.
271 Id. at 922. This language is similar to the language used in Thompson v.
Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
827
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Several members of the Georgia House of Representatives 27 2
took these words to heart, and introduced a bill that was signed
into law in April, 2000, allowing a parent to monitor and intercept
a minor child's phone conversations.273 Jim Stokes, a member of
the Georgia House Judiciary Committee, sponsored the bill based
on a letter he received from David Scott, the victim's father, asking
him to address the lack of statutory support for parents to legally
wiretap their children's telephone conversations.274 Mr. Stokes
stated that when the bill was originally drafted, the drafters
intended to make the bill consistent with federal law, but the result
was more restrictive. The Committee sought a limited means of
permitting parents to monitor their children's activities for the
purpose of protecting them, particularly in sexual molestation
cases.
275
Mr. Stokes acknowledged that the trial court's decision not to
admit the tape recordings between Bishop and the victim into
evidence under the previous law was the correct legal decision.276
However, to assist parents in similar situations, the law needed to
be changed. Mr. Stokes agreed that parents have the authority to
control their children, especially in situations where they suspect
their children are in trouble.277 He stated that although the new
272 These members include Jim Stokes, Stephanie Stuckey, Judith Manning,
Don Edwin Wix, and Rich Golick.
273 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(d).
274 Telephone interview with Jim Stokes, Member of the Georgia House
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 2000).
275 Id. Mr. Stokes said that the bill probably would not have made it out of
the House Judiciary Committee if it were not for him limiting it; the Committee
wanted to be certain that the new law was not too expansive. Id. Although the
bill was originally drafted to solely address the issue at hand, Mr. Stokes and I
agreed that the language as amended is not all that limiting; the law has much
broader implications than intended. Id.
276 Telephone interview with Jim Stokes, Member of the Georgia House
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 2000).
277 Id.; see also Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)
("[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children
is basic in the structure of our society."); Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307,
310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (observing that parents' legal duty to control their children
is created both by statute and the parent-child relationship) (footnotes omitted)
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law is susceptible to a constitutional challenge because of its
breadth, he feels quite comfortable with it.278
Judith Manning, also a member of the Georgia House of
Representatives, is a former member of the Department of Family
and Children Services Board.2 79 Throughout her career, she
witnessed many sexual molestation cases where parents were semi-
aware of their children's physical abuse. 28 ° Ms. Manning met
with the victim and her family, and she became involved in the
Bishop v. State28 1 case "because it was clear to her that Bishop
was 'overwhelmingly guilty' and the girl's parents were helpless,
going into trial with hearsay evidence. 282 Although Ms. Manning
acknowledged that the United States Constitution prevents unrea-
sonable invasions of privacy, this was a situation where there were
obvious signals that the child was suffering: the victim's grades
dropped; her demeanor changed dramatically; and she neglected her
(quoting People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907)).
278 Telephone interview with Jim Stokes, Member of the Georgia House
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 2000).
279 Telephone interview with Judith Manning, Member of the Georgia House
of Representatives (Oct. 2000).
280 Id.
28' 526 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
282 Jeffrey Widmer, Convicted Molester May Get 100 Years, MARIETTA
DAILY J., Oct. 18, 2000, at 1B (quoting the remarks of Judith Manning). Ms.
Manning stated that people like Bishop prey on others like the victim in this
case, who had a poor self-image and was not strong enough to stand up to him.
Telephone interview with Judith Manning, Member of the Georgia House of
Representatives (Oct. 2000). Expressing her disgust with the case, Ms. Manning
stated that Bishop used, abused, and molested the victim to a sickening point. Id.
He beguiled her to the point where she thought he was enamored with her, and
gave her several keepsakes as a token of their "pre-engagement." Id. In the
beginning, the victim was too scared to turn on Bishop. Id. She did not have the
clear judgment necessary to testify against him right away, because Bishop
clouded her mind so severely, in a sense telling her that her parents were demons
and he was there to save her. Id. Bishop had the ability to persuade and control
the victim, and used such control in a perverse manner to take over what should
have been the victim's free and independent judgment. Id. He had the attitude
that since he hadn't been caught before, it was okay for him to continue such
heinous acts. Id. Bishop declared his innocence in the last breath he took before
he was convicted. Id.
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personal appearance.283 The new law gives parents the power to
monitor their children when they begin manifesting different
behavioral patterns. Ms. Manning stressed that the Bishop case was
a serious matter; it was not merely a case of a parent snooping
through a child's room or reading a diary to learn about the child's
healthy personal life.284 Thus, parents should be legally protected
to intercept a child's phone calls where the child's welfare is at
stake, and parents should not abuse the law to determine the truth
in situations other than where they suspect their child is in physical
or emotional danger.285
The drafters intended the bill to be narrowly tailored in order
to protect children in situations such as the Bishop case; the new
statute, however, has broader applicability.286 The new law grants
parents wide discretion and autonomy to exercise authority over
their children, and vests children's right to privacy with the parents.
It allows parents to determine the maturity of their children and use
telephone wiretapping to protect them accordingly.
As a result of Georgia's new law, on October 13, 2000,
Superior Court Judge George H. Kreeger convicted Bishop of child
molestation, two counts of aggravated child molestation, and aggra-
vated sexual battery.287 Sentencing took place on November 29,
2000, and Bishop was sentenced to ten years for each count, a sum
total of thirty years.288 He is required to serve ninety percent of
that sentence, or twenty-seven years.289
283 Bishop, 526 S.E.2d at 517.
284 Telephone interview with Judith Manning, Member of the Georgia House
Representatives (Oct. 2000).
285 Id.
286 Telephone interview with Rich Golick, Member of the Georgia House of
Representatives (Oct. 2000).
287 Widmer, supra note 282, at lB.
288 Telephone interview with Mr. Manning, Commercial Real Estate Broker




C. Time for a Change: Amending Title III to Resemble
Georgia's New Law
As the trend of children killing children in schools around the
country grows, the issue of parental responsibility and control over
their children's behavior and activities is receiving greater attention
than ever before.290 To prevent tragic events like the Columbine
High School massacre291 from occurring in the future, it is
necessary to afford parents the legal means to gain knowledge
about their children's plans and take action before their children
engage activities that are seriously harmful to themselves or others.
One cannot expect parents to reasonably know of their children's
29 On October 1, 1997, sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham killed his mother
before killing three students and wounding seven others at his high school in
Pearl, Mississippi. Mirah A. Horowitz, Kids Who Kill: A Critique of How The
American Legal System Deals With Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, 63 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133 (2000). On December 1, 1997, in West Paducah,
Kentucky, fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal killed three students at a high
school prayer meeting. Id. On March 24, 1998, in Jonesboro, Arkansas, thirteen-
year-old Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden killed four
schoolmates and a teacher. Id. On May 21, in Springfield, Oregon, fifteen-year-
old Kip Kinkel killed his parents before opening fire in the school cafeteria,
shooting twenty-four classmates, killing two of them. Id. On April 20, 1999,
Dylan Klebold, seventeen, and Eric Harris, eighteen, killed thirteen people at
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, and subsequently committed
suicide. Id. On March 5, 2001, a fifteen-year-old freshman opened fire in a
restroom at his high school in Santee, California, killing two students and
wounding thirteen other people. Ben Fox, Alleged School Gunman Shot
Randomly, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 15177333.
On March 7, 2001, at Bishop Neumann High School in Williamsport, Pennsylva-
nia, a fourteen-year-old girl shot and wounded a classmate in the school
cafeteria. Edward Wong, Girl, 14, Arrested After a Classmate is Shot in
Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at 20. On March 22, 2001, eighteen-
year-old Jason Hoffman, a senior at Granite Hills High School in El Cajon,
California, opened fire near the school's administration building, wounding three
students and a teacher, before he was shot and wounded by a police officer. Jeff
Adler & William Booth, Five Wounded in Month's 2nd Calif. School Shooting;
Suspect, 18, Shot by Police Officer, in Serious Condition, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
2001, at A03.
291 See supra note 1.
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propensities for wrongful acts. Adding a provision to Title III that
resembles § 16-11-66(d) of Georgia's wiretapping statute, allowing
parents to monitor and intercept a minor child's telephone conver-
sations with or without the consent of the child, will provide
parents with the necessary legal tool they need to inform them-
selves of their children's activities.
Georgia's new law is broad in the sense that it does not simply
authorize interception of communications when there is reasonable
cause to believe the interception would provide evidence of the
commission of or involvement in certain enumerated crimes, such
as drug use or child abuse, but instead, authorizes parents to use
their discretion to decide when to monitor and intercept a minor
child's conversation.292 While the basis for a parent's objectively
reasonable or good faith belief to intercept a child's phone calls
may not always be clear, both the courts and the legislatures must
allow parents to use their discretion in these types of situations,
since they are the ones who are best equipped to determine what
is in their child's best interest. 293 Given that the parents typically
act in accordance with their child's best interests, they should not
be held criminally or civilly liable for taping their children's
conversations.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history accompanying Title III does not indicate
that parents are prohibited from monitoring and intercepting their
children's phone conversations. 294 To eliminate any uncertainty
concerning Title III's applicability to parental wiretapping,
Congress should re-draft Title III to resemble Georgia's wiretap-
ping statute, which exempts recording parents from liability as long
as it is done to ensure the welfare of a minor child. Parents need
wide latitude and discretion to make decisions on behalf of their
children, including vicariously consenting to the interception of
telephone conversations within the house where the parent and
292 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(d) (2000) (authorizing parental
wiretapping for the broad purpose of ensuring the welfare of a minor child).
293 See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
294 Killian, supra note 37, at 578.
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children reside. "[T]he vicarious consent doctrine creates a narrow
test which focuses the analysis on why a parent felt compelled to
record the child's conversations." '295 Such a test is not likely to
be abused because the defendant parents have the burden of
proving that they acted in the child's best interests in order to
avoid liability under Title 111.296 The vicarious consent exception,
however, differs from Georgia's exception in two major respects.
Even with the consent of a party to the conversation, the person
intercepting the communication may not be insulated from liability
if they attempt to disclose or use the information obtained.297 In
addition, "[a]ny evidence derived from an illegally intercepted oral
or wire communication is not admissible at any trial or hearing in
any court., 298 However, Georgia's law, allowing parents to
intercept and record a minor child's phone conversations, with or
without the consent of such child, permits disclosure of the
information obtained and the admissibility of the recording in a
judicial proceeding. 299 This makes it easier to identify and locate
the person(s) responsible for attempting to involve a child in
criminal activity affecting the welfare or best interest of such child,
as well as prosecute any person(s) responsible for engaging in
criminal conduct involving such child as a victim.
295 Killian, supra note 37, at 578.
296 Killian, supra note 37, at 576.
297 Bogosavijevic, supra note 25, at 327; see also 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(c)-(d)
(2000); United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1508 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The
statute does not expressly provide a 'consent to use' exception to section
2511 (1)(d)").
298 Ann B. Frick & Marjorie J. Long, Interspousal Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping: An Update-Part 11, 24 COLO. LAW. 2569, 2569 (1995). The
statutory prohibition reads:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence at any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000).
299 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(d) (2000).
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A parent's reasonable suspicions including, but not limited to,
a child's drug or alcohol use, gang affiliation, or participation in
other illegal or criminal activities, either as a victim or a perpetra-
tor, is sufficient to warrant close surveillance of such child. By
amending the federal wiretapping statute to resemble Georgia's
statute, parents will be afforded adequate legal protection to
exercise their authority to intercede when they have a good faith,
objectively reasonable basis for concern regarding the safety of
their children as victims of the criminal conduct of another, or
believing there is an attempt to involve such child in criminal
activity. In today's world, where horrifying school shootings have
become almost commonplace, and parents are held accountable for
their children's crimes, it is imperative that parents have access to
information that could prevent future tragedies from occurring.
